Jeanette Tsang ; Konstantin Beznosov

15 December 2006

Abstract: We present a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) illegally rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks.

Keyword(s): IEEE 1588 ; Precise Time Protocol ; Network Time Protocol ; security analysis ; time synchronization ; network security

Published in: Jeanette Tsang, Konstantin Beznosov, "A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol", presented at the Eighth International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), Raleigh, North Carolina, USA, 5 December, 2006.: