000000125 001__ 125
000000125 005__ 20130522141951.0
000000125 037__ $$aLERSSE-PRESENTATION-2006-061
000000125 041__ $$aeng
000000125 100__ $$aJeanette Tsang
000000125 100__ $$aKonstantin Beznosov
000000125 245__ $$aA Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol
000000125 260__ $$c2006-12-15
000000125 300__ $$a21p
000000125 520__ $$aWe present a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) illegally rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks. 
000000125 6531_ $$aIEEE 1588
000000125 6531_ $$aPrecise Time Protocol
000000125 6531_ $$aNetwork Time Protocol
000000125 6531_ $$asecurity analysis
000000125 6531_ $$atime synchronization
000000125 6531_ $$anetwork security
000000125 8560_ $$fqiangw@ece.ubc.ca
000000125 8564_ $$uhttp://lersse-dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/125/files/125.pdf$$yTransfer from CDS 0.99.7
000000125 909C4 $$pJeanette Tsang, Konstantin Beznosov, "A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol", presented at the Eighth International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), Raleigh, North Carolina, USA, 5 December, 2006.
000000125 980__ $$aPRESENTATION