A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol (Short Paper)

Jeanette Tsang ; Konstantin Beznosov

18 October 2006

Abstract: This paper reports on a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks.

Keyword(s): IEEE 1588 ; Precise Time Protocol ; Network Time Protocol ; security analysis ; time synchronization ; network security

Published in: Jeanette Tsang, Konstantin Beznosov "A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol (Short Paper)," In Proceedings of Eighth International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), Raleigh, North Carolina, USA, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, LNCS 4307, 4-7 December, 2006, pp.50-59. :

The record appears in these collections:
Refereed Conference Papers
Network Security

 Record created 2009-04-27, last modified 2013-05-22

Transfer from CDS 0.99.7:
Download fulltext

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
(Not yet reviewed)