000000123 001__ 123
000000123 005__ 20130522141942.0
000000123 037__ $$aLERSSE-RefConfPaper-2006-019
000000123 041__ $$aeng
000000123 100__ $$aJeanette Tsang
000000123 100__ $$aKonstantin Beznosov
000000123 245__ $$aA Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol (Short Paper) 
000000123 260__ $$c2006-10-18
000000123 520__ $$aThis paper reports on a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks. 
000000123 6531_ $$aIEEE 1588
000000123 6531_ $$aPrecise Time Protocol
000000123 6531_ $$aNetwork Time Protocol
000000123 6531_ $$asecurity analysis
000000123 6531_ $$atime synchronization
000000123 6531_ $$anetwork security
000000123 8560_ $$fqiangw@ece.ubc.ca
000000123 8564_ $$uhttp://lersse-dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/123/files/123.pdf$$yTransfer from CDS 0.99.7
000000123 909C4 $$pJeanette Tsang, Konstantin Beznosov "A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol (Short Paper)," In Proceedings of Eighth International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), Raleigh, North Carolina, USA, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, LNCS 4307, 4-7 December, 2006, pp.50-59. 
000000123 980__ $$aRefConfPaper