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# JavaPolis 2004

## Middleware and Web Services Security

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# Do you know what these mean?

- SOAP
- WSDL
- IIOP
- CSI v2



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## Overall Presentation Goal

**Learn what security mechanisms  
are available in middleware and  
Web services products**





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# Speaker's Qualifications

## Konstantin

- Worked for end-user, consulting, and developer organizations
- Co-authored CORBA Security standards proposals
  - Resource Access Decision
  - Security Domain Membership Management (SDMM)
  - CORBA Security
- Co-authored



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## This Slide Gains Your Audience's Attention

I do not believe current tools,  
technologies, and methodologies support  
“Extreme” Performance Testing.





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## How many of you can explain?

- Various security mechanisms
- What middleware and Web services are
- What makes middleware and Web services security special
- What common architectures for security mechanisms are in most middleware and Web service technologies
- What are the differences among security mechanisms of various middleware and Web service technologies?



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# Outline

- **Part I: Security**
  - What are security mechanisms?
- **Part II: Middleware and Web services**
  - What are middleware and Web services?
  - What's special about middleware and Web services security?
- **Part III: Security in middleware and Web services**
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  - What are the differences among security mechanisms of COM+ and EJB?
- **Part IV: Conclusions**
  - Summary
  - Where to go from here?





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# What is Computer Security?

- security -- “safety, or **freedom from worry**”
- How can it be achieved?
  - Get rid of the sources of worry
  - Don't trust computers anything valuable
  - Make computers too **heavy** to steal
  - Buy **insurance** (liability transfer)
  - Create **redundancy** (disaster recovery services)



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# Goals of Security

- **Prevention**
  - Prevent attackers from violating security policy
- **Detection**
  - Detect attackers' violation of security policy
- **Recovery**
  - Stop attack, assess and repair damage
  - Continue to function correctly even if attack succeeds



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# What Computer Security Policies are Concerned with?

- Confidentiality
  - Keeping data and resources hidden
- Integrity
  - Data integrity (integrity)
  - Origin integrity (authentication)
- Availability
  - Enabling access to data and resources

# CIA



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# Conventional Approach to Security

Protection					Assurance				
Authorization		Accountability		Availability		Requirements Assurance	Design Assurance	Development Assurance	Operational Assurance
Access Control	Data Protection	Audit		Service Continuity	Disaster Recovery				
		Non-Repudiation							
		Authentication							
		Cryptography							



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# Protection

- provided by a set of mechanisms (**countermeasures**) to prevent bad things (**threats**) from happening





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# Authorization

protection against breaking rules

Rule examples:

- Only registered students should be able to take exam or fill out surveys
- Only the bank account owner can debit an account
- Only hospital's medical personnel should have access to the patient's medical records
- Your example...




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
# Access Control

Definition: **enforces the rules, when rule check is possible**


Subject  
Principal  
User, Client  
Initiator



Action



Object  
Resource  
(data/method  
s/menu item)  
Target



Security  
Subsystem

Mix of terms:

Authorization == Access Control Decision

Authorization Engine == Policy Engine



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## Authorization Mechanisms: Data Protection

- No way to check the rules
  - e.g. telephone wire or wireless networks
- No trust to enforce the rules
  - e.g. MS-DOS



# Accountability

You can tell who did what when

- (security) audit -- actions are recorded in audit log
- Non-Repudiation -- evidence of actions is generated and stored




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# Availability


- **Service continuity** -- you can always get to your resources
- **Disaster recovery** -- you can always get back to your work after the interruption




# Types of Security Mechanisms




secure




precise



broad



set of reachable states



set of secure states



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# Assurance

Set of things the system **builder** and the **operator** of the system do to **convince** you that it is really safe to use.

- the system can **enforce** the policy you are interested in, and
- the system works as **intended**




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How do you decide which policies  
to enforce and mechanisms to use?



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
# It's all about risk



$$\text{Risk} = \text{Asset} * \text{Vulnerability} * \text{Threat}$$



# Security is a Process



Source: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. 1999

# Classes of Threats

- Disclosure
  - Snooping
- Deception
  - *Modification*
  - *Spoofing*
  - repudiation of origin
  - denial of receipt
- Disruption
  - *Modification*
  - denial of service
- Usurpation
  - Modification
  - *Spoofing*
  - Delay
  - denial of service



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# Key Points

Protection					Assurance				
Authorization		Accountability		Availability		Requirements Assurance	Design Assurance	Development Assurance	Operational Assurance
Access Control	Data Protection	Audit		Service Continuity	Disaster Recovery				
		Non-Repudiation							
Authentication									
Cryptography									





## Key Points (cont-ed)

- *Secure, precise, and broad* mechanisms
- Risk = Asset \* Vulnerability \* Threat
- Steps of improving security
- Classes of threats
  - Disclosure
  - Deception
  - Disruption
  - Usurpation
- Reference monitor mediates **actions** of **subjects** on **objects**



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
# What is middleware?

It's what's between topware and underwear



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
# Distributed Application Built Using DOS



"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)

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
# Distributed Application Built Using NOS



"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)

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# Distributed Application Built Using Middleware



"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)




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# Software Support for Distributed Applications

System	Description	Main Goal
DOS	Tightly-coupled operating system for multi-processors and homogeneous multicomputers	Hide and manage hardware resources
NOS	Loosely-coupled operating system for heterogeneous multicomputers (LAN and WAN)	Offer local services to remote clients
Middleware	<b>Additional layer atop of NOS implementing general-purpose services</b>	<b>Provide distribution transparency</b>



# Most Middleware Uses Remote Procedure Call




"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)



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# RPC Clients and Servers



"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)

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# Distributed Objects

- Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) Remote Objects
- Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)
- Microsoft's Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) & COM+
- Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI)
- Enterprise Java Beans
- .NET Remoted Objects



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
# Middleware Services

- Communication facilities
- Naming
- Persistence
- Concurrency
- Distributed transactions
- Fault tolerance
- Security



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# Middleware Openness



"Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms" by A. S. Tanenbaum, M. van Steen. Prentice Hall; (2002)

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# What's Middleware Openness?

- Operating system independent
- Completeness and portability
- Interoperability





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# What's Web Services?



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
# How do middleware and Web services differ?

Features/ properties	middleware		Web services
	traditional	MOM	
Client server	yes	no	no
RPC	yes	no	no
OS independent	mostly	mostly	no
Completeness and portability	yes	mostly	no
interoperability	yes	yes	yes



# Promise of Web Services

- Interoperability across lines of business and enterprises
  - Regardless of platform, programming language and operating system
- End-to-end exchange of data
  - Without custom integration
- Loosely-coupled integration across applications
  - Using Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)



# Web Services Features

*XML-based messaging interface to computing resources that is accessible via Internet standard protocols*

- WS help *intranet* (business units) and *extranet* (business partners) *applications* to communicate
- SOAP – format for WS communications
  - Defined in XML
  - Supports RPC as well as document exchange
    - o No predefined RPC semantics
  - Stateless
  - Can be sent over various carriers: HTTP, FTP, SMTP, ... postal service



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
# SOAP Message Example

```
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/soap-envelope">
  <env:Header>
    <n:alertcontrol xmlns:n="http://example.org/alertcontrol">
      <n:priority>1</n:priority>
      <n:expires>2001-06-22T14:00:00-05:00</n:expires>
    </n:alertcontrol>
  </env:Header>
  <env:Body>
    <m:alert xmlns:m="http://example.org/alert">
      <m:msg>Pick up Mary at school at 2pm</m:msg>
    </m:alert>
  </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
```



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
# Typical Web Service Environment





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# J2EE Web Service Systems







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# client-server paradigm & security



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# requirements due to distribution

- centralized administration
- localized run-time decisions



# object paradigm & security (1/2)

- objects

- small amounts of data ==> large numbers
  - o R: Scale on large numbers of objects and methods
- diverse methods ==> complex semantics
  - o R: Security administrators should not have to understand semantics of methods

- collections

- R: Similar names or locations should NOT impose membership in same collection(s).
- R: For an object to be assigned to the same collection, name similarity and/or co-location should not be required.



## object paradigm & security (2/2)

- many layers of indirection and late binding
- names
  - multi-name, nameless and transient objects
  - R: Transient objects should be assigned to security policies without human intervention.
  - less rigid naming hierarchies
  - R: No assumptions that administrators know a name of each object in the system.



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# Outline


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
# Middleware Security Stack





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# Policy Enforcement and Decision



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
# Distributed Authentication

- Password-based
- Symmetric key
  - e.g., Kerberos
- Asymmetric key
  - e.g., PKI



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# Data Protection



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# Data Protection in Web Services



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# SOAP Message with WS-Security

```
<? Xml version='1.0' ?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope"
  xmlns:sec="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/04/secext"
  xmlns:sig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
  xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
  <env:Header>
    <sec:Security
      sec:actor="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope/actor/next"
      sec:mustUnderstand="true">
        <sig:Signature>
          ...
        </sig:Signature>
        <enc:EncryptedKey>
          ...
        </enc:EncryptedKey>
        <sec:BinarySecurityToken
          ...
        </sec:BinarySecurityToken>
      </sec:Security>
    </env:Header>
    <env:Body>
      <enc:EncryptedData>
        ...
      </enc:EncryptedData>
    </env:Body>
  </env:Envelope>
```



# WS-Security

- Message integrity and message confidentiality
- Compliance with XML Signature and XML Encryption
- Encoding for binary security tokens
  - Set of related claims (assertions) about a subject
  - X.509 certificates
  - Kerberos tickets
  - Encrypted keys



# XML Encryption

- Encrypt all or part of an XML message
- Separation of encryption information from encrypted data
- Super-encryption of data

```
<EncryptedData xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'
  Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content'>
  <EncryptionMethod Algorithm='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#3des-cbc' />
  <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'>
    <ds:KeyName>John Smith</ds:KeyName>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
  <CipherData>
    <CipherValue>A23B45C56</CipherValue>
  </CipherData>
</EncryptedData>
```





# XML Signature

- Apply to all or part of a document
- Contains: references to signed portions, canonicalization algorithm, hashing and signing algorithm Ids, public key of the signer.
- Multiple signatures with different characteristics over the same content

```
<Signature Id="MySignature" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  <SignedInfo>
    <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/.../REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
    <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
    <Reference URI="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xhtml1-20000126/">
      <Transforms>
        <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
      </Transforms>
      <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <DigestValue>j6lwx3rvEP00vKtMup4NbeVu8nk=</DigestValue>
    </Reference>
  </SignedInfo>
  <SignatureValue>MC0CFFrVLtRlk=...</SignatureValue>
  <KeyInfo>
    <KeyValue>
      <DSAKeyValue>
        <P>...</P><Q>...</Q><G>...</G><Y>...</Y>
      </DSAKeyValue>
    </KeyValue>
  </KeyInfo>
</Signature>
```




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# Security Policy Decisions




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# Policy Enforcement and Decision



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# scaling policy decisions



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# Credentials Delegation

- What are credentials?
- Push and pull models



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- **No delegation**



- **Simple delegation: impersonation or controlled**



- **Composite delegation**



- **Also: combined privileges, traced delegation**





# Issues in Distributed Audit

- Monitor activity across and between objects.
- Order of the audit records is hard to determine because of the lack of global time.
- Performance
- No guarantee that an event has been logged.





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## COM+ Specifics



# Authentication in COM+

- Supported mechanisms
  - Kerberos
  - Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM)
- Granularity modes
  - Never
  - At the time of establishing secure channel
  - On every call
  - With every network packet
- Credentials delegation options
  - No delegation
  - Unconstrained simple delegation (a.k.a., impersonation)
    - o Only one hop for NTLM



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# Data Protection in COM+

- Supported modes
  - Origin authentication and integrity protection
  - As above + confidentiality protection



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
# Access Control in COM+

- The three hurdles to go through
  1. Activate server process
  2. Process border checks
  3. DLL border checks
- Granularity
  - Component
  - Interface
  - Method



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# COM+ Access Control Architecture



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# Accountability in COM+

- No out-of-the-box support
- Developers should rely on Windows event logs






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# EJB Specifics



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# EJB Run-time Security



Common Secure Interoperability (CSI) v2  
defines wire protocol



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# Authentication in EJB

- Defines only the use of JAAS for authenticating and credentials retrieving
- Implementation-specific
- Credentials delegation options
  - No delegation
  - Unconstrained simple delegation (a.k.a., impersonation)



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# Data Protection in EJB

- Implementation-specific




# Access Control in EJB

- Configured through deployment descriptor
- Granularity
  - Down to individual method on a class, but not bean instance
  - Can be different from JAR to JAR
- Expressiveness
  - method grouped into “**method permissions**”
  - Subjects grouped by plain **roles**
  - No role hierarchy
- JSR 115: “J2EE Authorization Contract for Containers” -- APIs for plugging authorization engines



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# roles and permissions in EJB



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# Accountability in EJB

- Implementation-specific





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# Outline

- **Part I: Security**
  - What are security mechanisms?
- **Part II: Middleware and Web services**
  - What are middleware and Web services?
  - What's special about middleware and Web services security?
- **Part III: Security in middleware and Web services**
  - What are common architectures for security mechanisms in most middleware and Web service technologies?
  - What are the differences among security mechanisms of COM+ and EJB?
- **Part IV: Conclusions**
  - Summary
  - Where to go from here?



# Summary

- **Security**
  - Objectives: CIA
  - Means
    - Protection
      - Authorization, Accountability, Availability
    - Assurance
- **Middleware & Web services**
  - Software layer between OS and application to provide transparencies
  - Security-related issues: scaling, granularity, naming
- **Security in Middleware & Web services**
  - Common features/elements
  - Technology/product specific



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# Where To Go From Here?

- JavaPolis
  - Access control architectures: EJBs versus COM+
  - Erwin Geirnaert: "Hacking J2EE servers"
  - Secure agility/agile security
- Secure application development course
  - <http://www.secure-application-development.com>
  - <http://www.secappdev.com>
- Books
  - B. Hartman, D. J. Flinn, K. Beznosov, and S. Kawamoto, chapter 7, **Mastering Web Services Security**, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003.
  - E. Roman, S. Ambler, and T. Jewell, **Mastering Enterprise JavaBeans**, Second ed: Wiley Computer Publishing, 2002.
  - B. Hartman, D. J. Flinn, and K. Beznosov, **Enterprise Security With EJB and CORBA**. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001.
  - "Security Engineering ..." by Ross Anderson



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## If You Only Remember Three Things...

- Build security in from the beginning
- Push security out of the applications
- Design for change



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# Reserved slides



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