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A graphic of a recycling symbol (three green arrows forming a triangle) overlaid on a blue and white globe of the Earth.

**JAMES:**  
**Junk Authorizations for**  
**Massive-scale Enterprise Services**

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# outline

- the problem
  - context
  - target environment
  - limitations of point-to-point architectures
- the approach
- summary & future work



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# the problem

# context

- processor time virtually **free**
- human time/attention **expensive**
- commodity computing most **cost-effective**

# target environments




# target environments


with 0.5M of commodity computing systems

- 0.5--1.5M application instances
- with MTTF of 1 year
  - 1,300--4,000 fail every day
- with availability of 99.9%
  - 500--1,500 unavailable at any given moment


# request-response paradigm



# enables PDP reuse



results in point-to-point architectures



# addressed problem

point-to-point authorization architectures at massive scale

- become too **fragile**, requiring costly human attention, and
- fail to reduce **latency** by exploiting the virtually free CPU resources and high network bandwidth




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# the approach

# addressing the problem

1. **decouple** PEPs from PDPs with publish-subscribe architecture(s)
2. **recycle** policy decisions
3. **flood** PEPs with speculatively computed (junk) authorizations


# publish-subscribe architecture



Used properties:

- many-to-many
- asynchronous


# publish-subscribe for policy decisions



# recycling authorizations


Bob is a *customer*

- He gets authorization to view "Software Design"



# recycling authorization

- Alice *preferred customer*
  - More privileges than Bob
  - System **recycles** the authorization for Bob and allows Alice to view the book





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# Secondary and Approximate Authorizations Model (SAAM)

# basic elements

## ■ request <s, o, a, c, i>

- s -- subject
- o -- object
- a -- access right
- c -- context
- i -- identity of the request

<{id="Bob", role="customer"}, {id="eB-23"}, view, {date="05-08-15"}, 6112>

## ■ response <r, i, E, d>

- r -- response identity
- i -- identity of the request
- E -- evidence
- d -- decision

< 934598438, 6112, [ ], allow > -- direct (from PDP) response

< 943498843, 6115, [ 6112 ], allow > -- indirect/precise response

< 990923124, 6120, [ 6112 ], allow > -- indirect/approximate response

# recycling authorizations


- **secondary** authorizations
  - re-using decisions made for other, but **equivalent**, requests
  - example  $\langle s, o, a, c, i \rangle \langle s, o, a, c, i' \rangle$
- **approximate** authorizations
  - re-using decisions made for other, but **similar**, requests
  - examples
    - preferred customer  $\geq$  customer  $\geq$  visitor
    - row  $\leq$  table
    - read  $\leq$  modify



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**back to JAMES**

# flooding with speculative authorizations



# summary

## ■ problem

- context and assumptions
  - human time/attention is too expensive
  - CPU resources are virtually free
  - commodity computing is most cost effective
- target environments
  - massive-scale enterprises with  $10^5$  machines
- limitations of point-to-point architectures
  - too fragile, high latency, too expensive to maintain

## ■ approach

- decouple PEPs and PDPs with publish-subscribe
- recycle authorizations
  - secondary and approximate authorization model (SAAM)
- flood with junk authorizations

# current status and future work

- current work
  - SAAM<sub>BLP</sub>, SAAM<sub>RBAC</sub>, SAAM<sub>significant</sub>
  - simulation
  - P2P-based authorization recycling
  - publish-subscribe for authorizations
- future work
  - speculative authorizations



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# An Overview of The Ongoing Research at LERSSE

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# What's LERSSE?

## Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering

- Research group at the Department of Electrical & Computer Eng. UBC
- People
  - Faculty
    - Konstantin Beznosov, lead (computer security)
    - Sidney Fels (Human Computer Interaction), lead of HCT Lab
  - 2 Ph.D. students
  - 5 Master students + 2 joining in September

<http://lersse.ece.ubc.ca>

# Research Directions and Projects

## 1. engineering security mechanisms

- *CORBA Security, RAD, AAS, RAD JACCet, SDMM, attribute function, EASI, composable authorization engines, **JAMES**, AC mech. eval.*

## 2. access control models & languages

- *CORBA-RBAC, ReIBAC XACML v1.0, **SAAM**, probabilistic trust*

## 3. engineering secure software

- **agile security assurance**

## 4. network security

- **MC-SSL**

## 5. critical infrastructure interdependencies

- **CITI interdependencies**

## 6. usable security

- **HOT Admin**

# agile security assurance

## problem

mismatch between agile development & security assurance

## contributions


- 1. examined** (pain points)
- 2. classified** assurance methods
- 3. alleviated** (tools, knowledge codification, new methods research, intermittent assurance)

## Further research


- tool support
- knowledge classification
- new assurance methods

# HOT Admin: Human, Organization, and Technology Centred Improvement of IT Security Aministration

- purpose
  1. evaluation methodology for sec. admin. effectiveness
  2. guidelines and techniques to design sec. admin. tools
- problem addressed
  - conflict of human, organizational, and technological forces
- approach
  - resolve the conflict through harmonizing the forces
- work plan (3 years)
  1. pilot studies to fine-tune the methodologies
  2. inventories and an initial analysis through field research
  3. development of models
  4. design of techniques and methodologies
  5. validation and evaluation of the project's key results.
- team
  - Kosta Beznosov (security), Sid Fels (interfaces), Lee Iverson (collaborations), Brian Fisher (interaction)



# multiple-channel SSL



- end-to-end security with partially trusted proxies
- selective data protection