

# **Computer and Distributed Security: Introductory Overview for Researchers**

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
# We Will Discuss Today:

- What is security of computer systems
- Security and usability
- The main challenge for security
- Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
- Security Concerns
- Distributed Security
- Security Functionalities
- Summary
- References

# What is security of computer systems

- Security – “the quality or state of being secure” [5]
- Secure – “free from danger; free from risk of loss; affording safety” [5]
- “The goal of computer security is to provide *insights, techniques, and methodologies* that can be used to *mitigate threats.*” [2]

# Security and Usability<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup>From [2]

# The Main Challenge for Security Research and Practice

How do we build computer systems that are:

- secure
  
- useful
  
- cost-effective
  - require reasonable resources to
    - \* design
    - \* test
    - \* implement
    - \* administrate
    - \* maintain
    - \* deploy
  
- efficient
  
- etc.

# Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks

From [2]:


- “A **THREAT** to a computer system is any potential occurrence, malicious or otherwise, that can have an undesirable effect on the assets and resources associated with a computer system.”
- “A **VULNERABILITY** of a computer system is some unfortunate characteristic that makes it possible for a threat to potentially occur.”
- “An **ATTACK** on a computer system is some action taken by a malicious intruder that involves the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities in order to cause an existing threat to occur.”

# Main Types of Threats

From [2]:

- DISCLOSURE – “dissemination of information to an individual for whom that information should not be seen.”
- INTEGRITY – “unauthorized change to information stored on a computer system or in transit between computer systems.”
- DENIAL OF SERVICE – “access to some computer system resource is intentionally blocked as a result of malicious action taken by another user.”

# Threat Tree Example





# Threats: Probability, Damage, Effort, Criticality and Risk

- PROBABILITY of occurrence
- potential DAMAGE  $\approx$  CRITICALITY
- level of EFFORT required to enact the threat
- RISK
  - risk  $== \frac{\textit{criticality}}{\textit{effort}}$
  - risk  $== \textit{damage} * \textit{probability}$

# Security Concerns

- From [6]:

**Confidentiality** – Information is disclosed only to users authorized to access it.

**Integrity** Information is modified only by users who have the right to do so, and only in authorized ways. It is transferred only between intended users and in intended ways.

**Accountability** – Users are accountable for their security-relevant actions.

**Availability** – Use of the system cannot be maliciously denied to authorized users.

# Distributed Security

- Distributed systems are different in the following ways from stand-alone computer systems from the point of view of security [3]:
  1. Have many components
  2. Have rich interactions between components
  3. Can introduce intricate boundaries of trust

## Security Functionalities/Services

- Security Service – “a combination of functional and data elements that are exercised through a well defined interfaces, provided by a security infrastructure, which ensures adequate security of computing information resources” [3]
  - Authentication
  - Access Control / Authorization
  - Communication Confidentiality
  - Communication Integrity
  - Communication Authenticity
  - Data Semantic Integrity
  - Audit
  - Non-repudiation

# Authentication

“making sure that a user or a service is who they claim to be” [7]

Authentication approaches [2]: something known, something embodied, something possessed

Result of authentication – a set of the user credentials: identity (for access, audit, non-repudiation), roles, affiliations, clearance

Research Issues:

- Strong, convenient, cheap, configurable authentication
- “Single Sign on”
- Delegation of credentials & composition of delegated credentials
- Anonymous identity
- Identity relationships in federations

# Access Control

“making and enforcing authorization decisions” [7]

**Mandatory Access Control (MAC)** – “enforces the specified mediation at the discretion of a centralized system administration facility” [2]

**Discretionary Access Control (DAC)** – “enforces the specified mediation at the discretion of individual users” [2]

# Authorization

“making decisions about what users and what services can access what system services and endorsing those decisions” [7]

Access Matrices, “Who to what?” vs “What by whom?”

Popular types of authorization mechanisms:

- Security Labels – confidentiality and integrity labels
- Permission Mechanisms (ala Unix permission bits)
- Access Control Lists (ACL – [akl])

## Authorization Research Areas

- Fine-grain authorization v.s. scalability
- Role-based authorization (RBAC)
- Federations
- Support for policies specific to particular vertical domains (healthcare, finance, electronic commerce, military)
- Decoupling authorization logic from application logic in COTS
- System property verification: “deadlocks”, who has access to what, what can be accessed by whom.
- “Soft” access control



# Communication Protection

**Communication confidentiality** – protecting communicated data from unauthorized disclosure

**Communication integrity** – protecting communicated data from unauthorized modifications

**Communication authenticity** – protecting communicated data from impersonation

Research Areas:

- See “Cryptography”

# Data Semantic Integrity

Application-specific data integrity

- Example: Errors in critical applications such as atomic stations, planes, killing systems, healthcare systems

Research Areas:

- Semantic integrity checks

# Cryptography

Research areas:

- Hard computational problems
  - Worst-case/average-case equivalence [1]
- Two-party computation protocols (e.g. notary signature) and Zero-knowledge protocols
- Interactive and probabilistic proof systems
- Pseudo randomness
- Proof techniques
- Distributed cryptography
- More in [4]

# Audit

Research areas:

- audit log analysis: detailed “recreation of picture” and real-time alerts
- selection of “interesting” events

# Non-repudiation

“protecting against originator of a message or action denying that it originated the message or the action as well as against the recipient of a message or action denying that they have received the message or was requested action” [7]

Example: Proving that service was provided in telecommunication market

Research Areas:

- Generating and storing evidence


# Intrusion Detection

It can be cheaper to detect intrusions than to control them

Traffic analysis

Event sequence analysis

Patterns



# Summary

**Threat** is a potential occurrence that can have an undesirable effect on the system assets and resources.

**Vulnerability** is an unfortunate characteristic that makes it possible for a threat to potentially occur

**Attack** is an action that involves the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities in order to cause an existing threat to occur

Security **Concerns**: Information Confidentiality, Information Integrity, Party Accountability, Service Availability

Security **Functionality** can be decomposed into: Authentication, Communication Confidentiality, Communication Integrity, Communication Authenticity, Access Control/Authorization, Audit, Non-repudiation



## References

- [1] Miklos Ajtai and Cynthia Dwork. A public-key cryptosystem with worst-case/average-case equivalence. In *Proceedings of Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 284–293. IBM, May 1997.
- [2] Edward Amoroso. *Fundamentals of Computer Security Technology*. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 1994.
- [3] Belinda Fairthorne. OMG white paper on security. OMG document number 1994/94-04-16, April 1994.
- [4] Shafi Goldwasser. New directions in cryptography: Twenty some years later. In *Crypto '97*, pages 314–324, 1997.
- [5] Merian-Webster. *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th edition, 1994.
- [6] Object Management Group. *CORBAservices: Common Object Services Specification, Security Service Specification*, 1996.
- [7] Wayne Wilson and Konstantin Beznosov. *CORBAmed Security White Paper*. Object Management Group, November 1997. OMG document number: corbamed/97-11-03.