




**Attribute Function:
an enabler for effective inexpensive
application-specific security decisions**

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
Overview

- ⇒ overview of security enforcement in distributed applications
- ⇒ problem motivation
- ⇒ Attribute Function
- ⇒ research plans
 - hypothesis
 - methodology




overview of security
enforcement in middleware

decision-enforcement paradigm




- Access control
- QoP (secrecy, integrity)
- Audit

Application space




	Decision Function	Enforcement Function
Application	AD	AE
Middleware	MD	ME

Red lines indicate cross-connections: AD to ME, AE to MD, and MD to AE.



Middleware Space

A landscape image with a bright yellow horizon line. The sky above is a mix of light blue and white, with some darker clouds. The foreground is a dark grey, almost black, gradient. The text "problem motivation" is written in a yellow, sans-serif font with a black outline, positioned in the lower-left quadrant of the image.

problem motivation

conflict of interests

Vendors:

stable
infrequently
changing
platform
security



Users:

security
decisions
based on
application-
specific factors

application-specific factors

⇒ Certain characteristic or property of an application's resource

- Produced, modified and processed in the course of normal application execution

⇒ Examples

- Bank account's holders and their ranks
- Phone numbers of telecom customer accounts
 - 5,000 changes/day with 10^6 subscribers


main objective

Keep middleware security generic and yet allow for application-specific security policies


Approach: additional level of indirection 😊

- Separation of concerns

ADME – application decides, middleware enforces




- could be inefficient on expensive to activate objects
- Vulnerable to deny of service attacks
- DF too complex for application developers to implement



Attribute Function


Proposed solution -- ADME/AF



- **Object Attributes**
- + Advantages of ADME
- + Separation of concerns
 - EF – middleware vendor
 - DF – authorization vendor
 - AF – application owner
- AF's input:
 - Information for identifying the target's state

Discussion

- Only information known before the object is called
- Not for all middleware platforms
- Not for all policies
- + Better tradeoff in responsibilities
- + Does not require application to implement either DF or EF
 - non-middleware platforms?
 - non-security policies

The background of the slide features a landscape with a bright yellow horizon line. Above the horizon, there are dark, silhouetted hills or mountains against a light, hazy sky. The lower portion of the slide is a solid, dark grey color.

Research Plans

hypothesis

the attribute function allows effective use of application-specific factors in security policy decisions without expensive coupling between the decision function and the application.

methodology

comparative analysis of AF-based designs vs.

⇒ traditional methods

- mixing security and application logic
- back-doors

⇒ emerging approaches

- tool-based weaving using Aspect Oriented Software Development (AOSD) techniques

what should it be compared on?

- ⇒ performance
- ⇒ expressiveness of the supported security policies
- ⇒ costs of application development, deployment, and maintenance
- ⇒ degree of the separation of responsibilities among application, middleware, and security developers
- ⇒ other?

experiment design

- ⇒ Alternative designs of decision/enforcement functions
 - Mixed security and application logic
 - Security logic modularized and weaved using AOSD techniques
 - ADME/backdoor
 - ADME/AF
- ⇒ Sample access control policies that require application-specific factors
- ⇒ Sample application
 - Depends on the platform
- ⇒ Experiment platform candidates
 - EJB
 - ASP.NET
 - CORBA ORB

performance

How fast security decisions are made and enforced

⇒ Decisions/second (throughput) for 1 client

⇒ Throughput = $f(|\text{client population}|)$

expressiveness

- ➔ What types of security policies and application-specific factors can be supported by the decision logic?

cost

- ⇒ How much effort is required to develop, deploy, and maintain secure distributed applications?
 - changes to the application logic
 - changes to the security policy
 - replacement of a security policy with a different type
- ⇒ Effort measures
 - changed lines of code? :)
 - other metrics?

separation of responsibilities

How many interdependencies exist among application, middleware, and security developers throughout an application life-cycle?

Summary

⇒ Hypothesis

- Attribute function allows effective use of application-specific factors in security policy decisions without expensive coupling between the decision function and the application

⇒ Methodology

- Comparative analysis of AF-based design vs. other designs based on performance, cost, expressiveness, and separation of responsibilities

Who will be doing it?

- ⇒ Looking for
 - faculty, and
 - bright, energetic, and enthusiastic graduate students
- ⇒ to collaborate on this and similar projects

- ⇒ Contact Konstantin Beznosov at beznosov@ece.ubc.ca