



# A Broad Empirical Study of IT Security Practitioners

**Konstantin (Kosta) Beznosov**

Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
University of British Columbia

# IT Security is Critical



# IT Security is Expensive

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organizations worldwide spent in 2007

\$1.55 trillion on IT

7-9% on IT security

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John Viega, McAfee

# Outline

- HOT Admin project
- How we do the study
- What we got

# **HOT Admin:** **Human Organization and Technology Centred** **Improvement of IT Security Administration**



sponsors and  
partners



# **HOT Admin:** **Human Organization and Technology Centred** **Improvement of IT Security Administration**

- Purpose
  - Tool evaluation: methodology
  - Tool design: guidelines & techniques



sponsors and  
partners



# HOT Admin: Human Organization and Technology Centred Improvement of IT Security Administration


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## Work Plan



Field study



Models

sponsors and  
partners



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
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Techniques &  
Methodologies

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
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Field study



Models



Techniques &  
Methodologies



Validation & Evaluation

sponsors and  
partners



# Project Team

**Dr. Konstantin Beznosov**

- Principal investigator (PI)
- Assist. Prof., ECE, UBC
- security; 5 years of industry




**Dr. Sidney Fels**

- Assoc. Prof., ECE, UBC
- new interfaces design



**Dr. Brian Fisher**

- Assoc. Prof. of Inter. Arts and Techn., SFU
- Adjunct Prof. in MIS and CS, UBC
- cognitive science-based interaction design




**Dr. Lee Iverson**


- Assist. Prof., ECE, UBC
- Inform. visualiz.
- collaboration infrastructures



# Human Organization and Technology Centred



# Human Organization and Technology Centred



hotadmin.org

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# Methods



# Recruitment



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## Challenges

- Overworked
- Secrecy culture
- Backstage

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## Approaches

- Professional contacts
- Practical benefits
- Gradual recruitment
- Gatekeepers



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
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
As of March 2008, 34 interviews with 36 participants

# Industry Sectors

participants




participated organizations



- Academic
- Finance
- Insurance
- Scientific services
- Manufacturing
- Retail/Wholesale
- Government Agency
- Telecommunications
- Non-for-profit Organization
- High-Tech
- IT Consulting


# Job Types



# Analysis



# Analysis



# Analysis Themes

Tasks & Tools

IT Security vs. General IT

Challenges

Interactions

Errors

Management Model

# Results



# Theme: Tasks and Tools

Tasks & Tools

IT Security vs. General IT

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
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**David  
Botta**



**Rodrigo  
Werlinger**



**André  
Gagné**

# No Security Admins!

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- system analysts
- application analysts
- business analysts
- technical analysts
- system administrators
- application programmers
- auditors
- IT managers
- security leads
- network leads


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
*“... what makes me [a security] analyst is that I'm also involved in developing the policies and procedures ... an analyst is also someone who's doing a certain amount of troubleshooting and someone who's, I guess, a little bit more portable in terms of what their daily responsibilities are going to be like.”*

Study Participant


# Loosely Coordinated Teams




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


*"I have a security team that I work with. They don't report to me but I actually work with them and they sort of are represented by the different areas."*

Study Participant



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# Three Main Kinds of Responsibilities

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## Respond

- Security incident
- Patch cycle
- Troubleshooting
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## Respond

- Security incident
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- ...

## Design

- Wireless access
- Filter script
- Application security architecture
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## Maintain

- Firewalls
- Legacy systems
- Records
- ...

# Activity Chain

- Monitor
- Be notified
- Prioritize
- Use/create documentation
- Solicit information
- Search
- Analyze
- Correlate
- Verify
- Choose/deploy response
- Report

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So what?

- interdependence of activities
- just-in-time decision making
- deployment of
  - resources
  - knowledge
  - skills

# Skills



# Skills

- Pattern recognition
- Inferential analysis
- Tacit knowledge

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## So what?

- finding gaps in tool support
- tool improvement
- new usability testing methods

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## ■ For more information

- D. Botta, R. Werlinger, A. Gagné, K. Beznosov, L. Iverson, S. Fels, and B. Fisher, “Towards understanding IT security professionals and their tools,” in the *Proceedings of the Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS)*, pp. 100-111, Pittsburgh, PA, July 18-20 2007.

# Theme: IT Security vs. General IT

Tasks & Tools

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**André Gagné**



**Kasia Muldner**

# IT Security vs. General IT

- Research question:
  - What differentiates security and general IT professionals?
- Motivation:
  - Current focus on general IT
  - Support tailored to security professionals (SP)



# Differences Along Five Dimensions

Scope

Troubleshooting  
Complexity

Usability vs. Security  
Tradeoff

Fast-paced  
Environment

Perception by  
Stakeholders

# Usability vs. Security

security professionals are constantly balancing  
usability and security

*“I think it [security and general IT] is different because **you have to balance the usability of the system [with its] security.** You can have a foolproof security system but it's not going to be very usable... the most secure system is when it's turned off, and behind locked doors”*

Study Participant

# Perception and Environment

# Perception and Environment

- Perception by stakeholders
  - Security professionals (SPs) are perceived in a less positive light by organizational stakeholders
- Fast-paced technological environment
  - “IT is a fast changing field and security is even faster”
  - (Only) SPs have to contend with active and continuous threats

# Scope: Need for Broader Scope

SPs need broader internal scope than general IT

*“... you really need to be able to look quite wide and deep. You need to be able to **look within the packet** in a lot of detail to understand how an intrusion detection system works... And at the same time you need to take a **wide look to an organization** to be able to determine ... the risks.... And that differs from IT where other groups can really be focused in one particular area”*

*Study Participant*

SPs need broader external scope than general IT

Legislation (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley)

# Model of Differences

Scope

Troubleshooting  
Complexity

Usability vs. Security  
Tradeoff


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
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


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
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
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
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
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**Rodrigo Werlinger**



**Kirstie Hawkey**

# Theme: Challenges

- Research question
  - What are the key challenges SPs face and how do the challenges interplay?
- Motivation:
  - Related work has studied challenges in isolation

# Challenges: Technological



# Challenges: Technological

- Vulnerabilities

# Challenges: Technological

- Vulnerabilities
- System Complexity
  - A typical network could have firewalls, DMZs, proxies, switches behind the firewall, routers in front of the firewalls, mail servers and not enough people to look after the overall security of these interconnected devices
- Mobile Access
  - Mobile user access makes it challenging to secure resources

# Challenges: Human

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- Culture

- Poor security practices result in difficulties to implement security controls

- Training

- SPs lack the necessary training

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- Culture

- Poor security practices result in difficulties to implement security controls

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- Communication

- Difficulties for SP's to communicate risks and security issues due to the lack of common view among stakeholders

# Challenges: Organizational

Risk Assessment

Business Relationships

Security Low Priority

Task Distribution

Open Environment

Tight Schedules

Data Access

Budget

# Challenges: Organizational

Risk Assessment

Difficult to estimate IT security risks

Business Relationships

Misaligned security policies make it challenging to enforce standards within an organization

Security Low Priority

Security is not a priority for many stakeholders

Task Distribution

Distribution of responsibilities was an issue: “the decentralized nature does not help”...

Open Environment


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## Technological Factors

## Human Factors




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R. Werlinger, K. Hawkey, K. Beznosov, "Human, Organizational and Technological Challenges of Implementing IT Security in Organizations", to appear in the *Proceedings of the Symposium on Human Aspects in Information Security and Assurance (HAISA)*, Plymouth, UK, 8-10 July 2008.



## Technological Factors

## Human Factors




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


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
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
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
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**David Botta**



**Kasia Muldner**

# Theme: Errors

- Research Question:
  - What leads to errors in security processes?
- Motivation:
  - Breakdowns during IT security management can put organizations at risk
  - Need for understanding the causes



# Terminology



# Terminology

- Error:

“a failure of a structure or process is an indication of error only to the extent that it prevents maximizing the outcomes of interest to the patient”  
[Hofer]


- IT security:

- the patient = organization
- Error = occurrence when security practices that do not maximize outcomes of interest, i.e., **sub-optimal situations**

# Suboptimal Situations

- Distributed and complex nature of IT security management
- Busby's framework for errors in a distributed system that includes:
  - Cues: an occurrence which ``participants use to determine when to act and how to act''
  - Norms: rules of some sort that help make the participants' subtasks consistent with each other
  - Transactive memory: is a type of mutual understanding, in which people in a group mutually know who is responsible for what
- Errors arise as a result of breakdowns in mutual understanding, cues, norms and transactive memory

# Suboptimal Situations



Distributed and complex nature of IT security management

Suboptimal situations, i.e., errors

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  - Cues: an occurrence which ``participants use to determine when to act and how to act''
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
# Summary



# Summary



Field study




Models


# Summary



Field study




Models





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Field study



Models







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Field study




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


Technological Factors

Human Factors



Organizational Factors



# Putting It All Together

- Complexity of IT security management
- Understanding of IT security professionals
- Guidelines for tool refinements and directions for future research


# Future Challenges

- Creating testable models for validating and extend findings?
- Transforming guidelines into concrete tool refinements?
- Evaluating tools refinements given the complex and distributed nature of IT security?

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