000000124 001__ 124
000000124 005__ 20130522141947.0
000000124 037__ $$aLERSSE-REPORT-2006-018
000000124 041__ $$aeng
000000124 100__ $$aJeanette Tsang
000000124 100__ $$aKonstantin Beznosov
000000124 245__ $$aA Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol
000000124 260__ $$c2006-12-05
000000124 300__ $$a23p
000000124 520__ $$aThis paper reports on a security analysis of the IEEE 1588 standard, a.k.a. Precise Time Protocol (PTP). We show that attackers can use the protocol to (a) incorrectly resynchronize clocks, (b) illegally rearrange or disrupt the hierarchy of PTP clocks, (c) bring the protocol participants into an inconsistent state, or (d) deprive victim slave clocks from synchronization in ways undetectable by generic network intrusion detection systems. We also propose countermeasures for the identified attacks.
000000124 6531_ $$aIEEE 1588
000000124 6531_ $$aPrecise Time Protocol
000000124 6531_ $$aNetwork Time Protocol
000000124 6531_ $$asecurity analysis
000000124 6531_ $$atime synchronization
000000124 6531_ $$anetwork security
000000124 8560_ $$fqiangw@ece.ubc.ca
000000124 8564_ $$uhttp://lersse-dl.ece.ubc.ca/record/124/files/124.pdf$$yTransfer from CDS 0.99.7
000000124 909C4 $$pJeanette Tsang, Konstantin Beznosov, "A Security Analysis of the Precise Time Protocol" LERSSE Technical Report LERSSE-TR-2006-02, December 04, 2006.
000000124 980__ $$aREPORT